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ABSTRACTIN THE DECADES since Sputnik, various satellite applications
have been developed with both military and civilian uses. The
military and public both regularly utilize satellite technologies
like remote sensing, telecommunications, and direct television
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broadcasting. Global positioning systems, designed initially for
military applications, have also successfully transitioned to civil-
ian use. However, it is notable that before the present millen-
nium, military and civilian satellites were usually exclusive of
each other and both tended to be government owned. Only in
recent years have private and commercial satellites become a sig-
nificant provider of satellite services, including for the military.
This article discusses the legal issues arising from this new trend
of using civilian satellite applications in global military efforts.
Particular focus is placed on the use of commercial remote sens-
ing data, communications, and global positioning systems by
armed forces deployed in the War on Terror. Through these
examples, the article observes that there is a need for interna-
tional guidelines on military use of dual-use satellite
technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The image of special operations forces riding horses alongside
Northern Alliance forces [in Afghanistan] belies their true capa-
bilities. Inside their saddle packs are global positioning system
(GPS) trackers, laser designators, satellite-communications gear
that enables them to talk directly to pilots overhead, and laptop
computers on which to download satellite imagery. They know
where they are. Through the clever combination of GPS-derived
position data, advanced communications, and a variety of Space
and airborne sensors, they are able to give fellow soldiers and
their commanders-in and outside the theater-a continuous
picture of their location and movements. . . . These force en-
hancement capabilities enable our special operations soldiers to
accurately identify the locations of targets from a safe distance,
relay the target coordinates via satellite phones or laptop com-
puters to warplanes circling overhead, and then get back on their
horses to ride to the next target.'
Information and communications technologies are now inte-
gral to the conduct of military operations. Forces around the
world are committing to constant technological innovation, es-
pecially since the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the
subsequent "War on Terror."2 The United States alone has
I Joseph M. Cosumano, Jr., Space Criticality to Ongoing Military Operations, ARMY
SPACE J., Spring 2002, at 2.
2 For discussion on the conduct of the War on Terror by the United States and
its allies, see Arnaud Blin, The United States Confronting Terrorism, in THE HISTORY
OF TERRORISM: FROM ANTIQUITY To AL QAEDA 398, 414 (G6rard Chaliand &
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poured billions of dollars into research and development pro-
grams, notably reinvigorating the then-ailing U.S. satellite tech-
nology sector.' Technology is promoted as cleaning up war,
allowing for more accurate information and targeting, and thus
reducing collateral damage and both military and civilian casu-
alties.4 In the War on Terror Operations, where ground commu-
nications infrastructure was often unavailable (as in the case of
Afghanistan) or unsecured (as in the case of Iraq), technology
proffered a mechanism to overcome such limitations.' Various
satellite applications, including remote sensing, communica-
tions systems, and GPS, have been utilized by the allied forces in
the War on Terror to facilitate and support their military and
Arnaud Blin eds., Edward Schneider et al. trans., 2007); VICTOR DAVis HANSON,
AN AUTUMN OF WAR: WHAT AMERICA LEARNED FROM SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE WAR
ON TERRORISM (2002); AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE FAILURE OF NATION BUILDING IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL
ASIA (2008); BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR (2002); BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF
ArrACK (2004); ANONYMOUS, IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST Is LOSING THE WAR
ON TERROR (2004).
See, e.g., Tony Capaccio, Lockheed Poised for $2.6 Billion U.S. Satellite Contract,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2012, 3:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
12-1 7/lockheed-poised-for-2-6-billion-u-s-satellite-contract.html; Jeffrey Hill,
Globecomm Inks $5.9 Million in Government Contracts, SATELLITETODAY.COM (Aug.
27, 2012), http://www.satellitetoday.com/military/headlines/Globecomm-Inks-
$5-9-Million-in-Government-Contracts_39378.html; Jeffrey Hill, U.S. Government
Satellite Industry Awaits Real Impact of Sequestration, SATELLITETODAY.COM (Mar. 28,
2013), http://www.satellitetoday.com/st/feature/U-S-Government-Satellite-In-
dustry-Awaits-Real-Impact-of-Sequestration_40924.html; Mark Holmes, MetiSpace
CEO Confident It Can Strike U.S. Government Deals This Year, SATELLITETODAY.COM
(Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.satellitetoday.com/regional/north-america/2013/
04/18/MetiSpace-CEO-Confident-It-Can-Strike-U-S-Government-Deals-This-
Year 41061.html; Rebecca Lincks, U.S. Government Renews ViaSat Broadband Air-
borne Satcom Services Contract, SATELLITETODAY.COM (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.
satellitetoday.com/military/headlines/U-S-Government-Renews-ViaSat-Broad-
band-Airborne-Satcom-Services-Contract_40305.html.
4 See William Saletan, In Defense of Drones: They're the Worst form of War, Except for
All the Others, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2013, 11:40 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
health and science/human-nature/2013/02/droneswarand civiliancasual-
ties how unmanned aircraft reduce collateral.html; WILSON W.S. WONG,
EMERGING MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES (2013); David
Hambling, 5 Weapons Systems to Reduce Collateral Damage, POPULAR MECHANICS,
http://vw.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/planes-uavs/5-weap-
ons-systems-to-reduce-collateral-damage#slide-1 (last visited May 19, 2014).
5 Eric Beidel et al., 10 Technologies the U.S. Military Will Need for the Next War,
NAT'L DEF. (Nov. 2011), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/
2011/November/Pages/lOTechnologiestheUSMilitaryWillNeedFortheNextWar.
aspx; Sandra I. Erwin, Army Networks Test Limits of Commercial Technologies, NAT'L
DEF. (May 2006), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2006/May/
Pages/ArmyNetworks5357.aspx.
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intelligence gathering.6 The result of such technological deploy-
ment has been a continued focus by the allied forces and their
respective governments to both innovate their technology and
develop different ways in which existing military and civilian
technologies, including satellite applications, can facilitate oper-
ations and make them more effective.7
This article explores such technology, specifically satellite ap-
plications, used by U.S. and allied military forces in the War on
Terror and uses practical examples to illustrate how such tech-
nology facilitates military and intelligence-gathering operations.
The article then discusses the general and specific principles of
international law dealing with military uses of satellite applica-
tions to argue that the present state of law is inadequate to re-
spond to recent developments in military uses of outer space.
The article concludes by suggesting several international guide-
lines-a precursor to a possible multilateral treaty-that the in-
ternational community should consider. These suggestions
provide some freedoms and restrictions on the military uses of
outer space, both in the context of the War on Terror and in
future international armed conflicts.
II. MILITARY USE OF SATELLITE APPLICATIONS IN THE
WAR ON TERROR
A. PAST AND PRESENT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE WAR
ON TERROR
In suggesting that there has been rapid advancement in war-
fare technology in the context of the War on Terror, this article
does not seek to suggest either that the War on Terror is new or
that the use of technologies in theaters of war is novel. For in-
stance, although the term "War on Terror" is customarily used
to describe the intelligence gathering and military operations
6 See, e.g., Chris Watt, Space Superiority Essential in War, SPACEDAILY.COM (Apr.
27, 2011), http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-04k.html.
7 Id.; see also Marco Ciceres, Military Satellites: The Next Generation, AEROSPACE
Am., Jan. 2002, at 20; Lina Khatib, Satellite Television, the War on Terror and Political
Conflict in the Arab World, in SPACES OF SECURITY AND INSECURITY: GEOGRAPHIES OF
THE WAR ON TERROR 205, 215-16 (Alan Ingram & Klaus Dodds eds., 2009); Jer-
emy Singer, Satellite Operations Must Evolve for War on Terrorism, Experts Say, SPACE
NEWS, June 2004, at 16; David Usborne, Space: The Final Frontier in America's War
on Terror, INDEPENDENT (May 25, 2010), www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
americas/space-the-final-frontier-in-americas-war-on-terrorism-1981976.html; Avi
Yariv, Israeli Spy Satellites Role in War Against Terror, i-HLS (Dec. 26, 2012, 3:42 PM),
http://i-hls.com/2012/12/israeli-spy-satellites-role-in-war-against-terror/.
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undertaken since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States,
it would be inaccurate to suggest that military operations against
terrorism did not take place before that date.' It would also be
incorrect to suggest that technology has not played a role before
the War on Terror.' However, there is no doubt that the War on
Terror heated up after the 9/11 terrorist attacks."o For instance,
on September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and de-
clared the terrorist attacks, directed from abroad, to be an
armed attack against all nineteen members of NATO." The
Bush Administration used the phrase "War on Terror" soon af-
ter the 9/11 terrorist attacks.'" On September 16, 2001, Presi-
dent Bush said, "This crusade-this war on terrorism-is going
to take a while, and the American people must be patient. I'm
going to be patient. But I can assure the American people I am
determined."' 3
The War on Terror waged by the United States and its allies
can be described broadly; in the context of this article, the term
includes the following operations (together, the "War on Terror
Operations"):
1) Operation Active Endeavour, a NATO naval operation in
the Mediterranean Sea beginning on October 4, 2001, in-
tended to prevent the maritime movement of terrorists
and weapons of mass destruction;14
8 See Gerard Chaliand & Arnaud Blin, The "Golden Age" of Terrorism, in THE
HISTORY OF TERRORISM: FROM ANTIQUITY To AL QADEA, supra note 2, at 175.
9 See id.
10 See Blin, supra note 2, at 398-419.
11 As of September 12, 2001, NATO had nineteen Member States: Belgium,
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Since then, nine more Member
States have acceded to the alliance: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. See North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr.
4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force Aug. 24, 1949); see also
Michael A. Goldberg, Mirage of Defense: Reexamining Article Five of the North Atlantic
Treaty After the Terrorist Attacks on the United States, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
77, 77, 82-83 (2003); Broderick C. Grady, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: Past,
Present, and Uncertain Future, 31 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 167, 169-70 (2002).
12 See Kenneth R. Bazinet, A Fight vs. Evil, Bush and Cabinet Tell US., N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Sept. 17, 2001), www.nydailynews.com/archives/Fight-evil-bush-cabinet-u-
s-article-1.919650.
13 Id.; see also SID JACOBSON & ERNIE COLON, AFTER 9/11: AMERICA'S WAR ON
TERROR (2001- ) (2008).
14 SeeJENNIFER MEDCALF, GoINc GLOBAL OR GOING NOWHERE? NATO's ROLE IN
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SECURfY 20 (2008); RIcHARD E. Rupp, NATO AF-
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2) Operation Enduring Freedom, the name given to a num-
ber of military operations involving the United States and
its allies in Africa, the Middle East, the Philippines, and,
most notably, Afghanistan, where the United States and a
coalition of allies invaded on October 7, 2001, with the
goal of deposing the Taliban regime for giving shelter and
support to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda;15
3) Operation Iraqi Freedom, also known as "Operation Fal-
coner" in Australia and "Operation Telic" in the United
Kingdom, involved the invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003,
by U.S.-led forces and its continuing occupation that en-
ded, at least on paper, on September 1, 2010;'" and
4) Operation New Dawn, the name given to the continuing
involvement of U.S.-led forces in non-combat operations
in Iraq.1 7
What this article does suggest is that, irrespective of the de-
bate on the usage of "War on Terror," it remains true that all the
associated conflicts share a common element: they involved the
widest scope of military use of satellite applications and the larg-
est amount of U.S. government investment in military and dual-
use space assets since the end of the Cold War."8
TER 9/11: AN ALLIANCE IN CONTINUING DECLINE 190 (2006); Kate Glassborrow,
Interview: Rear Admiral Richard Leaman (OBE), 111 JANE'S NAVY INT'L 66 (2006); see
generally OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (Lambert M. Surhone et al. eds., 2011).
15 See generally ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN ET AL., WINNING IN AFGHANISTAN: CRE-
ATING EFFECTIVE AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES (2009); SETH G. JONES, IN THE GRAVE-
YARD OF EMPIRES: AMERICA'S WAR IN AFGHANISTAN (2009); SEAN M. MALONEY,
ENDURING THE FREEDOM: A ROGUE HISTORIAN IN AFGHANISTAN (2005); TIM RIPLEY,
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: THE SEEDS OF WAR IN AFGHANISTAN (2011); DON-
ALD P. WRIGHT ET AL., A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) OCTOBER 2001-SEPTEMBER 2005 (2010);
AFGHANISTAN: TRANSITION UNDER THREAT (Geoffrey Hayes & Mark Sedra eds.,
2008); CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES (2008).
16 See WALTER . BOYNE, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: WHAT WENT RIGHT, WHAT
WENT WRONG, AND WHv (2003); THOMAS DONNELLY, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM:
A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT (2004); GREGORY HOOKER, SHAPING THE PIAN FOR OPER-
ATION IRAQI FREEDOM: THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS (2005);
KRISTIN F. LYNCH ET AL., LESSONS IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (2005); HISTORY
AS POLICY: FRAMING THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE POLICY
(Ron Huisken & Meredith Thatcher eds., 2007).
17 MICHAEL M. O'BRIEN, AMERICA'S FAILURE IN IRAQ INTERVENTION TO WITH-
DRAWAL 1991-2010, at 425-26 (2010); Nathan Hodge, As Combat Mission Ends, a
New U.S. Operation Begins, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704421104575463810656347880.
18 PAT TOWELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40567, DEFENSE: FY2010 Au-
THORIZATION AND APPROPRIATIONS 18 (2009); William Matthews, U.S. House-Senate
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While the use of advanced technology in warfare is not new,
the War on Terror certainly provided an impetus for the greater
militarization of space and cyberspace.1 9 For example, the U.S.
Air Force has a $46 billion portfolio on military satellite commu-
nications systems alone.2 0 Increasing demands on satellite appli-
cations by U.S. Armed Forces have spurred the evolution of
satellite technologies and the continuing expansion of commer-
cial capacity, with the military becoming the largest customer
for commercial and dual-use satellite applications. 2 ' The section
that follows will highlight the core satellite technologies and
their capabilities that have developed following the War on Ter-
ror Operations since 2001. By understanding their functions
and capabilities, one may then appreciate the legal issues that
arise from their use by military establishments in the War on
Terror.
B. SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
1. MILSTAR and AEHF Systems
The U.S. Air Force operates its Military Strategic and Tactical
Relay (MILSTAR) five-satellite communications system in geosta-
tionary orbit, providing jam-resistant and secure communica-
tions worldwide for the U.S. military. 22 This is in contrast to the
civilian and commercial satellite communications, such as IN-
MARSAT, that do not have such defensive capabilities." Each of
the MILSTAR satellites has a price tag of $800 million and pro-
Defence Bill Hits Arms Costs $491 Billion Funds]SF, but Trims FCS, Space Radar and
Satellite Programs, DEF. NEWS (Jan. 2, 2006); Richard Sanders, Satellites of War:
RADARSAT and Canada's Leading Role in the Militarisation of Space, CAN. DIMEN-
SION, Jul. 2006, at 14.
19 See Dan Freyer, Commercial Bus Rides: Fast Ticket to Space, VIA SATELLITE, Sept.
2009, at 12, available at http://www.satellitetoday.com/publications/2009/09/
01/commercial-Bus-Rides-Fast-Ticket-to-space.
20 Id.; Mark Holmes, Harding: Addressing Satcom Demand, SATELLITETODAY.COM
(Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.satellitetoday.com/military/netwarfare/Harding-Ad-
dressing-Satcom-Demand_33780.html; Anne Wainscott-Sargent, Commercial's
Growing Profile in the New MilsatCom Landscape, VIA SATELLITE, Sept. 2011, at 6,
available at http://www.satellitetoday.com/publications/Milsup/features/2011/
09/01/commercials-growing-profile-in-the-new-milsatcom-landscape/.
21 Greg Berlocher, Military Demand Brings Antenna Improvements, VIA SATELLITE,
Sept. 2010, at 6; Mark Holmes, Military Satellite Market To Remain Strong Around
Globe, VIA SATELLITE, Apr. 2009, at 14.
22 U.S. Air Force, Milstar Satellite Communications System, AIR FORCE SPACE COM-
MAND (June 20, 2011), http://space.au.af.mil/factsheets/milstar.htm.
23 MICHAEL P. GLEASON, EISENHOWER CTR. FOR SPACE & DEF. STUDIES, SPACE
POLICY PRIMER: PRINCIPLES, ISSUES, AND ACTORS 12-13 (2010).
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vides low data rate communications for voice and data at 75 bps
to 2,400 bps and medium data rate communications at 4.8 kbps
to 1.544 mbps.2 4
The U.S. Air Force is in the process of replacing the MILSTAR
system with the new Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHI) system, comprising six geostationary satellites providing
secure relay communications for the U.S. Air Force as well as
the armed forces of Canada, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom at a cost of $12.449 billion.2 5 In addition to voice and
data, the AEHFsystem will have the capacity to transmit tactical
communications such as real-time video, battlefield maps, and
targeting data exclusively for military applications.2 6
2. UFO System and MUOS
The U.S. Navy utilizes the UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellite
communications system for their ground communications,
given the need to maintain voice and data communications
channels across the world for its involvement in the War on Ter-
ror Operations.2 ' The proposed Mobile User Objective System
(MUOS) would double the declared military capacity for UHF
voice communications in high-density conflict zones, though it
is not expected to be operational until after 2018.28 Marco Cd-
cares has suggested a reason for the delay: "The sense we are
getting is that the U.S. military is perfectly willing to slow down
development of some of its space-based assets during the next
few years unless Congress [authorizes] generous increases in
funding. "2
24 See U.S. Air Force, supra note 22.
25 Amy Butler, USAF Plans for AEHF Launch Next Week, AVIATION WK. (Aug. 5,
2011), http://www.aviationnewsreleases.com/2010/08/usaf-plans-for-aehf-
launch-next-week.html.
26 Jane's Info. Grp., Advanced EHF (AEHF) System (United States), Satellite Systems
and Equipment, JANE'S MILITARY COMM. (June 22, 2011), http://articlesjanes.
com/articles/anes-Military-Communications/Advanced-EHF-AEHF-system-
United-States.html; Justin Ray, Air Force Launches Advanced New Military Satellite,
SPACE.COM (Aug. 14, 2010, 6:57 PM), http://www.space.com/8950-air-force-
launches-advanced-military-satellite.html.
27 CAcares, supra note 7; Donald V.Z. Wadsworth, Military Communications Satel-
lite System Multiplies UHF Channel Capacity for Mobile Users, in 2 MILCOM 1999: IEEE
MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 1145, 1145-52 (1999).
28 David A. Fritz et al., Military Satellite Communications: Space-Based Communica-
tions for the Global Information Grid, 27 JOHNs HOPKINS APL TECH. DIG. 32, 34
(2006); Donald V.Z. Wadsworth, supra note 27, at 1145; Cdcares, supra note 7.
29 CAcares, supra note 7.
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3. DSCS, WGS, and Dual-Use Satellites
The U.S. Army and other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces
utilize the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS),
which is a constellation of geostationary satellites designed to
provide high-volume and secure voice and data communica-
tions.so The DSCS is now operational beyond its expected ten-
year lifespan and is to be replaced by the Wideband Global
SATCOM (WGS) system, a joint venture between the Australian
and U.S. governments." The WGS system is expected to enable
the armed forces of both countries to have significantly en-
hanced capabilities in tactical command and control, communi-
cations, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (C4ISR).32
The deployment of the WGS system would enable U.S. and
allied forces to be less dependent on commercial satellite opera-
tors for communications services." In Australia, for example,
the Ka-band and X-band telecommunications links provided by
the Optus C1 satellite, launched in 2003, is presently used for
medium- to high-data-rate defense theater coverage as well as
for voice and data communications. 3 4 When the WGS partner-
ship between Australia and the United States was announced,
the spokesperson for the Australian Department of Defence
said:
Optus Cl provides SATCOM (satellite communication) coverage
over Australia and leased SATCOM services are used to provide
wideband SATCOM support to the [Australian Defense Forces
(ADF) ] elsewhere in the world . . . . The WGS system will provide
global SATCOM coverage to the ADF and communications ca-
pacity orders of magnitude greater than that provided by the cur-
rent SATCOM system. . . . Use of WGS allows [the ADF] to
30 WILLIAM E. BuRRows, DEEP BLACK: SPACE ESPIONAGE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
18-20 (1986).
31 Australia to Fund Sixth WGS Satellite, SATELLITETODAY.COM (Oct. 3, 2007),
http://www.satellitetoday.com/st/topnews/19168.html.
32 Justin Ray, Atlas 5 Rocket Successfully Launches Military Satellite, SPACEF-
LIGHTNOw.cOM (Apr. 3, 2009), http://spaceflightnow.com/atlas/avO16/; Austra-
lia to Fund Sixth WGS Satellite, supra note 31.
33 Australia to Fund Sixth WGS Satellite, supra note 31.
3 IAN M. DAVIS ET AL., A NEW X AND KA BAND SATELLITE EARTH TERMINAL
CAPABILITY FOR THE AuSTRAUAN DEFENCE FORCE (2005) (paper presented at the
9th Australian Symposium on Antennas, Feb. 16-17, 2005 in Sydney, Australia);
Trevor W. Mahoney, A Hybrid Civilian/Military Payload to Support Battlefield Commu-
nications, J. BATrLEFIELD TECH. (Mar. 1998), at 29; Press Release, Optus, Optus C1
Satellite Successfully Launched (Jan. 12, 2003).
78 [ 79
2014] MILITARY USE OF SATELLITES 79
reduce the operating budget associated with commercial
SATCOM leases. . . ."
The military use of dual-use communications systems, such as
the Optus C1, raises national security considerations."6 For in-
stance, one cause for concern is the Australian armed forces'
dependence on Optus, a satellite owned by a foreign operator,
Singapore Telcommunications, Inc.17 These concerns are allevi-
ated by Australian involvement in WGS."
4. Increasing Demand for Military Satellite Communications
The use of telecommunications satellites to provide mobile
communications beyond line-of-sight is one of the two most es-
sential satellite applications used in military operations (the
other being GPS) .3 For example, with 38,000 NATO and 47,000
U.S. troops in Afghanistan as well as 115,000 U.S. troops in Iraq
at the times of maximum deployment, the military has a great
demand for satellite communications services.40
Tim Lohman, Defence to Boost Satellite Communication Capabilities, COM-
PUTERWORLD.COM (Oct. 19, 2009, 9:09 PM), http://www.computerworld.com.
au/article/322575/defence boost satellite communicationcapabilities/.
36 See David Fickling, SingTel Stands to Get Forex Gain in Any Optus Satellite Sale,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2013, 4:21 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
03-19/singtel-stands-to-reap-forex-gain-in-any-optus-satellite-sale.html.
3 Id.; Mitchell Bingemann, Optus Floats Idea of Cutting Ties to Satellites, AUSTRA-
LIAN (Mar. 19, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/australian-it/
optus-floats-idea-of-cutting-ties-to-satellites/story-e6frgakx-1226600125468;
Gaurav Raghuvanshi et al., SingTel Looks at Sale: Telecom Puts Its Australian Satellite
Business Under Review, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2013, 1:39 PM), http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424127887323415304578367402547584568.html; David
Ramli, SingTel Sale to Boost Optus, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REv. (Mar. 19, 2013, 5:31 PM),
http://www.afr.com/p/business/companies/singtel-sale-to-boost-optus-uxlK
XMwUZCIJ6ePytr1wFK.
3 See Tom Allard, Australia to Share Defence Satellite, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/australia-to-share-de-
fence-satellite/2007/10/02/1191091115313.html; Grant Holloway, Singapore Spy
Claims Raise Australian Defense Fears, CNN (Aug. 8, 2001, 11:41 PM), http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/08/08/aust.sing.spies/; Lateline:
Optus Deal Questioned After Spy Allegations, ABC (Sept. 8, 2001), http://www.abc.
net.au/lateline/stories/s344102.htm; Joris Janssen Lok, Australia joins U.S. WGS




39 See Richard Kusiolek, Pace of Operations Increases Demand on Satcom on the
Move, VIA SATELLITE, Apr. 2010, at 6.
0 Id.; Mark Holmes, Satellite Vendors Ready to Meet Military Challenges, VIA SATEL-
LITE, Apr. 2008, at 6.
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Regardless of how much capacity is increased by the launch
and deployment of military satellite communications systems,
there will always be a need to supplement this capacity with the
purchase of bandwidth on commercial satellite systems.4' At pre-
sent, around 80% of all U.S. governmental satellite communica-
tions traffic, including that for the military, is carried over
commercial satellite communications systems.4 2 However, Rich-
ard Dalbello observed:
The government is our single largest customer . . . . And while
they are an extremely large and important customer, they re-
present only [12%] of Intelsat's total business. There has been an
explosion of demand for cellular backhaul services in Africa and
for video services in the Middle East . . .. There have been times
the government has needed bandwidth in specific regions and it
simply wasn't available."
With the War on Terror expanding beyond Afghanistan and
Iraq, it is crucial for the United States and its allies to increase
their communications capacity to meet their short- and long-
term C4ISR requirements." This demand can only be met
through deployment of advanced satellite communications sys-
tems in the near future, thereby increasing the military depen-
dence on space assets for communications."
C. REMOTE SENSING
1. Overview
Remote sensing has been used for centuries, both before and
during battle, to maintain an advantage over the enemy by hav-
ing knowledge of the deployment of strategic targets.4 6 Aerial
remote sensing began with hot air balloons before World War I
and advanced to the high-resolution satellites used today.
Since the beginning of the Space Age, satellite reconnaissance
41 Greg Berlocher, Military Continues to Influence Commercial Operators, VIA SATEL-
LITE, Sept. 2008, at 6.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 8.
- Mark Holmes, Governments Seek New Ways to Meet Communications Needs, VIA
SATELLITE, Apr. 2010, at 12; Watt, supra note 6.
4 Holmes, Governments Seek New Ways to Meet Communications Needs, supra note
44.
- See RICHARD C. OLSEN, REMOTE SENSING FROM AIR AND SPACE (200 7 );JULIE K.
PETERSON, UNDERSTANDING SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES: Spv DEVICES, PRIVACY,
HISTORY & APPLICATIONS (2007).
4 Brian D. Graves, Remote Sensing and Military Transformation: Lifting the
Fog of War (Dec. 6, 2005) (unpublished student project, Emporia State Univer-
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has been an invaluable tool for the military.48 During the Cold
War, the earliest U.S. satellite programs were classified military
remote sensing programs, and this has remained the case well
after the Cold War.4 9 The technologies utilized by the U.S. Na-
tional Reconnaissance Office, which operates and manages sat-
ellite remote sensing imagery data for the U.S. intelligence
services, include:
* optical satellites that use a mirror to gather visible light for
photography;
* infrared and ultraviolet satellites that record imagery in
those parts of the spectra;50
* radar imaging satellites that use microwave signals to scan
the surface of the Earth;5 1 and
* signal intercepting satellites that detect and record radio,
telephone, and data transmissions on the Earth and trans-
missions relayed by communications satellites.
The availability of satellite remote sensing data is invaluable to
armed forces across the globe.53 From a military perspective, ac-
cess to high-resolution remote sensing imagery is of such impor-
tance that the provision of such imagery by free services, such as
Google Earth, has raised significant security concerns for a num-
ber of nations, including the United States.54 For military opera-
sity), available at http://academic.emporia.edu/aberjame/student/gravesl/pro-
ject.html.
48 See Gary L. Hopkins, Legal Implications of Remote Sensing of Earth Resources by
Satellite, 78 MIL. L. REv. 57, 59-60 (1977); Ricky J. Lee, Reconciling International
Space Law with the Commercial Realities of the Twenty-First Century, 4 SING. J. INT'L. &
Comp. L. 194, 216 (2000); Malcolm Russell, Military Activities in Outer Space: Soviet
Legal Views, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 153, 154-59, 163, 175-80 (1984).
49 EYE IN THE SKY: THE STORY OF THE CORONA Spy SATELLITES 1, 3-4, 18
(Dwayne A. Day et al. eds., 1998).
50 Richard D. Hudson, Jr. & Jacqueline W. Hudson, The Military Applications of
Remote Sensing by Infrared, 63 PROC. IEEE 104, 106-08 (1975).
51 Mark Van Persie et al., Use of Remote Sensing Imagery for Fast Generation of Mili-
tary Maps and Simulator Databases 577 (Nat'l Aerospace Lab. N.L.R., Working Pa-
per Grp. No. NLR-TP-2000-397), available at http://reports.nlr.nl:8080/xmlui/
bitstream/handle/10921/857/TP-2000.397.pdftsequence=1.
52 Brian Crothers et al., U.S. Space-Based Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnais-
sance, in AU-18 SPACE PRIMER 167, 168, 176 (2009).
53 Dan Elliott, Glitch Highlights U.S. Military Reliance on GPS, NBC NEWS (June 1,
2010, 2:11 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/37451462/ns/usnews-security/#.
UvEbhuDnaos; Graves, supra note 47.
54 See Peter Eisler, Google Earth Helps Yet Worries Government, USA TODAY (Nov. 6,
2008, 5:20 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/surveillance/2008-
11-06-googleearthN.htm?csp=34; Katie Hafner & Saritha Rai, Governments Trem-
ble at Google's Bird's-Eye View, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.nytimes.
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tions, remote sensing data is essential for strategic planning,
deployment, monitoring, targeting, and threat assesment.55
Their strategic and tactical value cannot be understated.
2. Remote Sensing Use in the War on Terror Operations
Satellites have been heavily utilized by U.S. and allied troops
during the War on Terror to perform geospatial surveillance
and remote sensing.56 Soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the
U.S. Department of Defense acquired exclusive rights to the
data produced by the commercial Ikonos satellite so that it could
obtain imagery in Afghanistan and other theaters and also im-
prove situational awareness at all major U.S. military installa-
tions.5 ' However, this move was likely made for the twin
purposes of obtaining the high-resolution remote sensing im-
agery of Afghanistan while preventing the Taliban, al-Qaeda,
private actors, and the worldwide media from acquiring similar
quality images that could have assisted their combat operations
against U.S. and allied forces. 8
The U.S. Armed Forces have access to governmental remote
sensing satellites, the most notable being the Keyhole (KH) and
Lacrosse series of satellites.5 ' The most advanced KH satellites
have a resolution of around ten to fifteen centimeters but can-
not see through clouds and do not have "dwell capability" (the
ability to remain in orbit over an area of interest).60 The Lacrosse
satellites are radar imaging satellites that, while having a lower
com/2005/12/20/technology/20image.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Kelly
Hearn, Terrorist Use of Google Earth Raises Security Fears, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar.
12, 2007), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/03/070312-google-
censor.html.
55 See, e.g., Katrina Laygo et al., Drone Bombings in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas: Public Remote Sensing Applications for Security Monitoring, 4 J. GEOGRAPHIC
INFO. Sys. 136 (2012); John Shroder, Remote Sensing and GIS as Counterterrorism
Tools for Homeland Security: The Case of Afghanistan, in GEOSPATIAL TECHNOLOGIES
AND HOMELAND SECURITY 11, 11-12, 18, 20 (Daniel Z. Sui ed., 2008).
56 See Shroder, supra note 55, at 18-19.
57 Bijal P. Trivedi, U.S. Buys Up Afghanistan Images from Top Satellite, NAT'L GEO-
GRAPHIC (Oct. 25, 2001), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/10/
1025 _TVikonos.html; David Whitehouse, U.S. Buys Afghan Image Rights, BBC
NEws (Oct. 7, 2001, 11:57 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/
1604426.stm.
58 Whitehouse, supra note 57.
59 Emily Clark, Military Reconnaissance Satellites, CTR. FOR DEF. INFO. (Oct. 16,
2001), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/78523547/Terrorism-Satellite-Re-
connaissance (Center for Defense Information merged with Project on Govern-
ment Oversight in 2002, and its original website is no longer available).
60 Id.
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resolution than the KH satellites at one meter, use radar instead
of the visible spectrum, which allows real-time use in any kind of
weather, both during the day and at night.6 1
Similarly, in Iraq, U.S. and allied forces accessed remote sens-
ing imagery from both KH-11 and Lacrosse satellites." However,
some commentators question whether it was as effective as other
forms of intelligence gathering given the enemies were not state
63actors. Brian Graves, for example, referred to a case study
where the use of remote sensing imagery data was ineffective
"due to the use of simple camouflage techniques and the hiding
of forces among the buildings and streets of the urban area."6 4
Graves tempers this with a success story that saw coordination of
information that fed into highly successful and accurate air
strikes.65 These types of successes prove the ability of remote
sensing imagery to facilitate rapid engagement of targets using
fewer military assets:
This is also a key indicator of the significance of multi-spectral
sensors as the sandstorm would have blinded all other traditional
optical reconnaissance methods. The technology used ... is not
new, but the manner in which this and future tactical engage-
ments can be waged through the "fog of war" is indicative of the
manner in which the US military must proceed to maintain the
decisive edge.66
Both the Australian and U.S. military forces are focused in-
creasingly on advances in new technologies and integration with
existing technologies to create synergy between national assets
operated by their respective military establishments. 67 In partic-
ular, it was recently reported that both governments signed an
agreement to share remote sensing imagery data from the La-
crosse radar satellites, underlining the importance of remote
sensing data for the War on Terror. 8
61 Corina Neagu, Political and Legal Issues on Satellite Remote Sensing: Use of Artifi-
cial Satellites in Remote Sensing, 16 LEX ET SCIENTIA INT'L J. 50, 52 (2009); STANS-
FIELD TURNER, BURN BEFORE READING: PRESIDENTS, CIA DIRECTORS, AND SECRET
INTELLIGENCE 161 (2005); Clark, supra note 59.
62 Clark, supra note 59.
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D. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS
One of the most important satellite applications for U.S. and
allied armed forces since the Cold War has been GPS.6 ' GPS is a
satellite-based navigational system involving satellites and com-
puters that can determine the latitude and longitude of a re-
ceiver on Earth by computing the time difference for signals
from different satellites to reach the receiver."o GPS can deter-
mine location regardless of topography, weather, or time of day,
anywhere on Earth, provided the GPS receiver is not physically
obstructed." The military value of such technology was recog-
nized early in the Cold War by both the United States and the
Soviet Union and, consequently, GPS and equivalent systems
were deployed and maintained by both sides. 2
The military value of GPS in the War on Terror cannot be
understated. For example, when new software was installed in
the ground control systems for GPS satellites on January 11,
2010, it was reported that some GPS receivers were rendered
inoperable for days, affecting as many as 10,000 U.S. military
receivers on weapons, jet fights, ground forces, and naval ves-
sels." This coincided with reports that U.S. Strategic Command
and Air Force Space Command planned to reposition GPS satel-
lites to improve coverage for military GPS users in Afghanistan
and Iraq, as small units of troops are each given GPS receivers to
better pinpoint their geographical location and identify the co-
ordinates of surrounding terrain as well as enemy targets. 7 4
E. DIRECT TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTING
The military uses of communications satellites in direct televi-
sion and radio broadcasting have not received much attention,
particularly in the War on Terror Operations. Such military uses
of the broadcast of radio and television programming include:
69 Bradford W. Parkinson et al., The Origins of GPS, GPS WORLD, May 2010, at
30-31, GPS WORLD, June 2010, at 8 (story published in two separate issues).
70 See AHMED EL-RABBANY, INTRODUCTION To GPS: THE GLOBAL POSITIONING
SYSTEM 1-3 (2002).
71 See id. at 1; Thomas Bornschlegel, The History of the Global Positioning System
GPS 32 (May 14, 2009) (unpublished paper), available at http://www.imamu.edu.
sa/Scientific_selections/abstracts/Physics/The%20history%20of%2GPS.pdf.
72 Parkinson et al., supra note 69; Bornschlegel, supra note 71, at 8-9, 10,
21-22.
73 Elliott, supra note 53.
74 USAF Repositions GPS Constellation to Improve Coverage in Afghanistan and Iraq,
INSIDE GNSS (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.insidegnss.com/node/1839.
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* morale enhancement;
* broadcast of weather and other non-sensitive information;
* propaganda dissemination; and
* operational support."
Although the military and tactical potential for such uses was
recognized early on, particularly in the context of propaganda
dissemination, the use of direct television and radio broadcast-
ing in the War on Terror Operations has been somewhat re-
stricted by the limited availability of receiving equipment among
the local populations of Afghanistan and Iraq."6
III. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT LEGAL ISSUES
In order to determine the legal implications arising from the
military use of various satellite applications in the course of the
War on Terror, it is prudent to take into account three broad
areas of consideration:
1) the general principles of public international law in rela-
tion to military activities, particularly those contained in
the U.N. Charter, such as the prohibition on the use of
force under Article 2(4) and the right to self-defense
under Article 51;
2) the general principles of international space law in rela-
tion to military activities, particularly those contained in
the multilateral space treaties negotiated under the aus-
pices of the United Nations; and
3) the specific principles of international space law in rela-
tion to the specific satellite applications to the extent that
they are binding and applicable, and any restrictions and
prohibitions on military uses, whether directed against ter-
rorism or otherwise.
75 Aaron Hale & Dustin Ballinger, Military Applications for Digital Audio Radio
Service (DARS), in AEROSPACE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 1039, 1044-48 (2002).
76 Donald S. Harlacher, On Direct Satellite Broadcasting, AIR U. REv., Sept.-Oct.
1983, at 86; William J. Wallisch, Jr., Direct Satellite Broadcasting: You Haven't Seen
Anything Yet!, AIR U. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 111; U.S. International Broadcasting
into the War Zone: Iraq and Afghanistan: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Opera-
tions & Orgs., Human Rights, Democracy, & Global Women's Issues of the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 34 (2009) (responses of Joaquin Blaya, Jeffrey
Hirschberg, & Steven Simmons to questions submitted by Sen. John F. Kerry).
2014] 85
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
These considerations are illustrated and summarized in Fic-
uRE 1 below.
SPEC IF IC M ILITARY USE O)F A SAT JInTE
APPUC1DON I1HEWVARONTEIARRR
Ceneral Piuciples afinternational Law G Iea Priniples of pace Law n
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PrnL Binding?
Figure 1. Legal Considerations in the Military Use of Satellite
Applications in the War on Terror
In any analysis of the legality of the military use of various
satellite applications, particularly those in the War on Terror, it
is pertinent to consider the various scenarios for the legal basis
for military operations under the U.N. Charter and then con-
sider them in the context of the legal principles under the
United Nations' space treaties and declarations.
IV. OPERATIONS DECIDED ON BY THE SECURITY
COUNCIL
A. ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE U.N. CHARTER
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that states are to
refrain "from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.""
This principle has been found by the International Court ofJus-
tice to be binding on all states as a customary norm, though the
prohibition is more relevant to international relations in the
event of its breach rather than its observance.
77 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
78 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 22, 98-101 (June 27).
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The legal prohibition on the use of force is not without excep-
tions." Under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security
Council may authorize the use of force "to maintain or restore
international peace and security" if there is a "threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" for which eco-
nomic and trade sanctions would be inadequate.8 0 Further, Arti-
cle 51 provides that there is an inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense "until the Security Council has taken mea-
sures necessary to maintain international peace and security."81
Without some legal basis for the use of force in the War on Ter-
ror Operations, these military actions would contravene the le-
gal prohibition on the use of force. Additionally, the use of
satellite applications in furtherance of such actions would not be
sanctioned by operation of the provisions of the U.N. Charter.
Ian Brownlie and David Harris both argue that even if Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter is narrowly construed, it nevertheless
amounts to a general prohibition on the use of armed force."
This is because one of the purposes of the United Nations is to
"maintain ... peace and security," and any form of use of force,
regardless of whether it is located in the territory of the other
state or not, is contrary to the stated purposes." As a result, the
use of force can be legally justified only where it is intended for
and restricted to self-defense or action authorized by the Secur-
ity Council under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter. 4
B. ARTICLE 42 OF THE U.N. CHARTER
Article 42 of the U.N. Charter forms the fundamental legal
basis for the authority of the Security Council to authorize or
require the use of force by states. It provides:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inade-
quate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
7 See id. at 102.
80 U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42.
81 U.N. Charter art. 51.
82 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 266-68
(1963); DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 889-90
(6th ed. 2004).
83 See U.N. Charter art. 42.
84 See id.; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 268-69.
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operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations.
Traditionally, Article 42 was the only provision in the U.N. Char-
ter that allows the Security Council to "take action by air, sea or
land forces" where necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security."' However, the International Court of
Justice took a contrary view in Certain Expenses of the United Na-
tions, rejecting the proposition that the use of force in the
Congo must be based on Article 42 of the U.N. Charter."
Under the U.N. Charter, Member States are obliged to com-
ply with decisions of the Security Council, and to the extent that
such obligation under a decision of the Security Council is in-
consistent with a treaty obligation, the decision of the Security
Council prevails. Consequently, the Security Council has the
legal authority under Article 42 to override the prohibitions and
limitations imposed under the U.N. space treaties, whatever the
scope or content of these prohibitions and limitations may be.
C. SELF-DEFENSE AND ARTICLE 51
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security."9
This recognizes the inherent right in international law of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense where an armed attack takes
place, at least "until the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security," 90 In the
85 U.N. Charter art. 42.
86 See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
ITs FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 744-45 (1951).
87 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 167 (July 20) (it
can also be based on the consent of the Congolese government or on Article 51
of the U.N. Charter).
88 U.N. Charter arts. 25, 103.
89 U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
90 Id.
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absence of any express provisions in a resolution of the Security
Council, this doctrine could arguably justify the use of force
against Iraq in the defense of Kuwait, for example, even though
at the time the armed attack against Kuwait was already
complete.91
It is interesting to note that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
considers collective self-defense to be a right rather than an obli-
gation, even though one would probably consider collective se-
curity to be the responsibility of all states rather than a "right" to
be exercised. It may be seen that states have completely surren-
dered their sovereignty in relation to the use of force to the Se-
curity Council and, as a result, collective self-defense has
become a "right" to use force outside the authority of the Secur-
ity Council rather than an obligation borne by states toward
other states in the international community. 92
The practical effect of this is that Article 103 of the U.N. Char-
ter, applying only to obligations and not rights," would have no
impact on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The right of a state to
use force in self-defense in outer space, therefore, would have to
observe the prohibitions and limitations imposed under the
U.N. space treaties, including those that may affect the military
uses of satellite applications.
V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAW
A. OVERvIEw
1. The Multilateral Space Treaties
In parallel with the technological advancements made in the
final frontier of outer space, the creation of the present corpus
91 KELSEN, supra note 86, at 792; DEREK W. BOwETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 216-18 (1958).
92 See Malvina Halberstam, The Right to Self-Defense Once the Security Council Takes
Action, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 229, 248 (1996).
It is difficult to believe that some 180 states would have agreed to
give up the most fundamental attribute of sovereignty, the right to
use force in self-defense, to an international body, and particularly
one like the Security Council. The Security Council decides on the
basis of the political interests of the states voting-the state at-
tacked may not even have a vote. It is inconceivable that they would
have done so in language that affirms the "inherent right of individ-
ual and collective self-defense."
Id.
93 U.N. Charter art. 103.
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of international space law is due substantially to the efforts made
in the adoption of multilateral treaties. In particular, many of
these efforts were made by states within the multilateral frame-
work of the United Nations.
The two most relevant of these treaties are the Treaty on Prin-
ciples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial
Bodies (Outer Space Treaty);94 and the Agreement Governing
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(Moon Agreement)."
2. Outer Space Treaty
It was agreed from the early days of the workings of the Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) that the
adoption of a treaty containing basic and general principles of
space law was preferable at that time to a comprehensive legal
code on space activities, similar to that eventually created under
the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea."6 The main reason
for this was the need to adapt to constantly evolving space tech-
nologies and new space applications. As the U.S. Secretary of
State, Dean Rusk, stated at the time, the Outer Space Treaty is
an "outstanding example of how the law and political arrange-
ments can keep pace with science and technology."" This is not
a feature exclusive to the development of space law-a similar
progressive approach was taken with international human rights
94 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened
for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967)
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
95 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
July 11, 1984) [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
96 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). To some extent, this de-
bate continues today with the issue being one of four discussion topics of the
2004 Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space in Vancouver, Canada. See Mimi
Lytje, Obstacles on the Way to a General Convention, 47 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER
SPACE 267 (2004); Natalia R. Malysheva, General Convention on Space Law: Some
Arguments for Elaboration, 47 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 254 (2004);
Lotta Viikari, Problems Related to Time in the Development of International Space Law,
47 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 259 (2004).
97 Letter of Submittal from Secretary Dean Rusk, Department of State, to Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson, in Hearings on the Treaty on Outer Space Before the Sen.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong. 109, 112 (1967).
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instruments. 8 It is in this context that the United Nations
adopted the Outer Space Treaty in 1967.
The fundamental legal principles contained in the Outer
Space Treaty include:
1) the freedom of exploration and use of outer space and ce-
lestial bodies by all states on a non-discriminatory basis;"
2) the prohibition of national appropriation of outer space
and celestial bodies by claim of sovereignty, use, occupa-
tion, or by any other means; 00
3) the application of international law, especially the U.N.
Charter, to space activities;o
4) the complete demilitarization of celestial bodies and the
prohibition on the deployment of weapons of mass de-
struction in outer space;I0 2
5) the requirement of states to render assistance to astronauts
in distress and repatriate foreign astronauts and space ob-
jects found in their territories;1 0 3
6) international responsibility of states for "national" space
activities and their liability for injury, loss, and damage
caused to other states; 0 4
7) the jurisdiction and control over a space object by a state
through placement of the space object;10 5
8) the requirement that space activities must be conducted
with due regard to the interests of other states and poten-
tial harmful interference in the activities of other states is
to be avoided;"' and
98 Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1950, there has been a
significant number of international legal instruments dealing with various issues
of human rights, such as colonialism, racial discrimination, children, education,
religious tolerance, women, and slavery. See Universal Human Rights Instruments,
U.N. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RTs., www.ohchr.org/en/profession-
alinterest/pages/universalhumanrightsinstruments.aspx (last visited May 19,
2007).
99 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art. I.
100 Id. art. II.
101 Id. art. III.
102 Id. art. IV.
103 Id. art. V.
104 Id. art. VI-VII.
10 Id. art. VIII.
106 Id. art. IX.
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9) states are to avoid harmful contamination of the Earth and
any adverse changes to the environment of the Earth by
the introduction of any extra-terrestrial matter.17
As of January 1, 2013, 102 states have ratified the Outer Space
Treaty and another 26 states have signed it.108 It has been noted
that all states involved in space activities are parties to the Outer
Space Treaty and that at least some of its provisions are likely to
have crystallized into customary international law, although this
is somewhat controversial due to the comparatively little state
practice and opinio juris on space activities compared to other
subject matters of international law.109
B. ARTICLE TV OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
1. Interpretation of Article IV
The United Nations, through COPUOS, has long affirmed
the principle that military uses of outer space are to be limited
or confined in some way by the law. However, the specific provi-
sions of the treaties are far from clear because they appear to
draw distinctions between outer space sensu stricto, the empty
space between celestial bodies, and outer space sensu lato, which
includes both "outer space" and the celestial bodies." 0 For ex-
ample, Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty states that:
1. States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the [E]arth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or
any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer
space in any other manner.
2. The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.
107 Id.
108 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Status of
International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January
2013, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2013/CRP.5 (Mar. 28, 2013).
10- Bin Cheng, The 1967 Outer Space Treaty: Thirtieth Anniversary, 23 AIR & SPACE
L. 156, 162-63 (1998).
110 Bin Cheng, Introducing a New Term to Space Law: "Outer Void Space", 11 Ko-
REAN J. AIR & SPACE L. 321, 321-26 (1999); Bin Cheng, Properly Speaking, Only
Celestial Bodies Have Been Reserved for Use Exclusively for Peaceful (Non-Military) Pur-
poses, but Not Outer Void Space, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF
CONLIcr: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR L.C. GREEN ON THE OCCASION OF His
EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 81-117 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2000); Arjen Vermeer, The
Laws of War in Outer Space: Some Legal Implications for Jus ad Bellum and Jus in
Bello of the Militarisation and Weaponisation of Outer Space, in THE NEW ORDER OF
WAR 69-88 (Bob Brecher ed., 2010).
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The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifi-
cations, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct
of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbid-
den. The use of military personnel for scientific research or
for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The
use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful explo-
ration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not
be prohibited."
The first limb of Article IV is a prohibition on the deployment
of any nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
in outer space. 12 This presumably refers to outer space sensu
lato, thus including outer space, the Moon, and other celestial
bodies. However, this prohibition does appear to prevent the
stationing of any other type of weapon in outer space for mili-
tary purposes, such as conventional or even laser weapons. This
prohibition also does not prevent use or detonation of any nu-
clear weapon or other weapons of mass destruction in outer
space. In other words, the prohibition in Article IV alone does
not prevent states from using outer space for military purposes
or activities, provided that these do not involve deploying nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer
space.'13
2. Application of Article IV
It is interesting to consider the effects that Article III of the
Outer Space Treaty has on the prohibitions in Article IV. On
one hand, the specific reference to the U.N. Charter suggests
that some primacy should be given to compliance with the Char-
ter and, accordingly, any inconsistency between the Outer Space
Treaty and the U.N. Charter would cause the terms of the latter
to prevail.11 4 On the other hand, Article III of the Outer Space
Treaty provides that it is the entire corpus of international law-
not only the U.N. Charter-that applies to activities in the ex-
ploration and use of outer space.115 The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) provides that later
treaties prevail over earlier treaties, subject to the operation of
11I Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art. IV.
112 Id.
113 Bin Cheng, The Legal Status of Outer Space and Relevant Issues: Delimitation of
Outer Space and Definition of Peaceful Use, 11 J. SPACE L. 89, 101-02 (1983).
114 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art. III.
115 Id.
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Article 103 of the U.N. Charter."' Given the above discussion, it
is apparent that obligations arising from the U.N. Charter would
prevail over any rights or obligations contained in the Outer
Space Treaty; otherwise, the terms of the Outer Space Treaty
would prevail over the terms of the U.N. Charter in the event of
any inconsistency.
Within this context, the prohibitions as contained in Article
IV of the Outer Space Treaty would prevail over any other
treaty, save for any obligation arising under the U.N. Charter.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that states are to re-
frain "from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Na-
tions."'1 7 This obligation prohibiting the use of force by states
has been held to be an obligation erga omnes, as the principle is
considered to be jus cogens and thus binding on all states as a
customary norm.1 s The only provision of the U.N. Charter that
provides for an obligation to use force arises under Article 42,
which authorizes the Security Council to "take action by air, sea
and land forces" where necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security.' States are under an express obliga-
tion to comply with decisions of the Security Council, including
decisions arising under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter.12 0 To the
extent that Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty does not consti-
tute jus cogens, a decision made by the Security Council to use
military force in outer space would prevail over any prohibitions
or obligations under Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.'2 '
On the subject of self-defense, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
provides:
116 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vi-
enna Convention].
117 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
1I Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 116, art. 53
(for the effect of jus cogens on the treaty obligations of states).
119 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151,
167 (July 20). The ICJ noted that use of military force may also be lawfully con-
ducted with the consent of the subject state or based on the right of self-defense
as provided under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
120 See U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48.
121 See RickyJ. Lee, TheJus ad Bellum in Spatialis: The Exact Content and Practical
Implications of the Law on the Use of Force in Outer Space, 29 J. SPACE L. 93, 112
(2003).
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.' 22
Considering that self-defense, even collective self-defense, is ex-
pressed as a right rather than an obligation, Article 103 of the
U.N. Charter would have no effect on Article 51. The Vienna
Convention provides that a later treaty, such as the Outer Space
Treaty, prevails over an earlier treaty, such as the U.N. Charter,
in the event of any inconsistency, subject only to Article 103 of
the U.N. Charter.1 2 3 In this context, the prohibitions contained
in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty would arguably prevail in
all circumstances except where the Security Council decides ex-
pressly or impliedly that military action, including the deploy-
ment and the use of force in contravention of Article IV of the
Outer Space Treaty, is sanctioned under Article 42 of the U.N.
Charter. On the other hand, while this position would be cor-
rect in the context of the effects of Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, such a discussion must
also take into account that the right to individual and collective
self-defense has an existence as a jus cogens norm of customary
international law external to the terms of Article 51 .124 This can
be seen from the actual wording of Article 51 of the U.N. Char-
ter, which provides for the recognition of the "inherent right" to
self-defense rather than explicitly providing for the right to self-
defense within its own terms.1 2 5
Principles that are expressed as jus cogens norms, or peremp-
tory norms of general international law, have effect and prevail
122 U.N. Charter art. 51.
123 Vienna Convention, supra note 116, art. 30.
124 See, e.g., STANMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996); YoRum DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DE-
FENCE 164 (2d ed., 2001); Terry D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defence:
Anticipation, Pre-emption, Prevention and Immediacy, 11J. CONFLICT SECURITY L. 361,
363 (2006); Natalia Ochoa-Ruiz & Esther Salamanca-Aguado, Exploring the Limits
of International Law Relating to the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499,
508 (2005).
125 U.N. Charter art. 51.
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over express and implied terms of treaties in the event of any
inconsistency.12 6 To that end, Article 53 of the Vienna Conven-
tion provides that:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes
of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general inter-
national law is a norm accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character. 2 7
Accordingly, unless Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty is also
in itself a jus cogens norm of general international law, the right
to individual and collective self-defense as a jus cogens norm
would prevail over the prohibitions contained in the Outer
Space Treaty, if such a prohibition actually exists. With this con-
struction, it is apparent that the lawful use of force by one or
more states as sanctioned under Articles 42 or 51 of the U.N.
Charter would not be bound by the limitations contained in Ar-
ticle IV of the Outer Space Treaty. This is particularly the case in
relation to the deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of
mass destruction and the demilitarization of the Moon and
other celestial bodies. However, the unlawful use of force by one
or more states, namely military acts of aggression, would be
bound by the terms of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. It is
also noteworthy that if Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty is in
itself a jus cogens norm, then the right to individual and collec-
tive self-defense could conceivably be confined by its terms.
The ambit and scope of the restrictions in Article IV of the
Outer Space Treaty are also contingent upon whether one inter-
prets the text restrictively or expansively. This is because a re-
strictive interpretation of the provisions may lead one to argue
that the "exclusively for peaceful purposes" norm is restricted to
the specific military activities therein enumerated and prohib-
ited, namely, "[t] he establishment of military bases, installations
and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons [,] and the
conduct of military manoeuvers on celestial bodies."1 2 8 In apply-
ing the logic applied by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Steamship Lotus case, one may then argue that what
126 Vienna Convention, supra note 116, art. 53.
127 Id.
128 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art IV.
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is not specifically prohibited under this enumeration remains
permitted in law.'2 9 Considering that the right of self-defense
remains applicable, one can argue that these restrictions only
apply during times of peace and that the preparation for these
activities for the exercise of the right of self-defense remains
permissible.
In deconstructing the "exclusively for peaceful purposes"
norm in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, it is interesting to
note that within the enumeration of prohibited activities, the
word "attack" is not used. 3 o The omission of the word "attack"
strengthens the argument that the prohibitions in Article IV ap-
ply only to peacetime military activities. In international law, the
word "attack" is a concept of the law of armed conflict and is
defined in Article 49(1) of the Additional Protocol I to the Ge-
neva Conventions as an act of violence against an adversary; in
accordance with Article 49(2) of the Additional Protocol I, an
"attack" may be made either as an offensive or defensive opera-
tion, irrespective of the territory or the international space
where it is conducted.13 1
It is also important to note that the prohibited activities under
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty are not preceded with
words ("like" or "such as") presupposing that the activities are
generic enumerations. 1 3 2 The prohibited activities are simply
stated, which leads one to presuppose that the list is closed and
limited to these specific activities. From a grammatical perspec-
tive, the enumeration is not open-ended-there is no use of ver-
biage like "and other similar activities"-which gives further
credence to the restrictive interpretation theory.13 3
Under an expansive interpretation, these enumerations must
simply be seen as examples of generic activities that are prohib-
ited, or as examples that do not restrict the "exclusively for
peaceful purposes" verbiage.1 34 It should be noted that states are
generally reluctant to give expansive interpretations to restric-
tive terms, or vice versa, that could restrict their latitude of ac-
tion on issues of national security. In the context of the military
129 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
130 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art. IV.
'31 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 49, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
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use of satellite applications, a wide definition of "peaceful pur-
poses" would make more military applications of satellite appli-
cations permissible; conversely, a narrower definition of
"peaceful purposes" may pose a legal obstacle to some military
applications of space activities.'
VI. SPECIFIC SPACE LAW PRINCIPLES ON SATELLITE
APPLICATIONS
A. OVERVIEW
In the 1980s, after the adoption of the U.N. space treaties, the
international community, particularly the Legal Sub-Committee
of COPUOS, sought to formulate legal principles in relation to
specific space activities.' 6 Rather than adopting these principles
in the form of multilateral treaties, these principles were set out
in declarations annexed to resolutions of the U.N. General As-
sembly.' Although the resolutions lack the legal certainty pro-
vided by treaties, there is general acceptance that they have
some value in international rulemaking, as noted by the Interna-
tional Court ofJustice in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.
The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they
are not binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can,
in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for estab-
lishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opiniojuris.
To establish whether this is true of a given General Assembly res-
olution, it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions
for its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris
exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may
show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the
establishment of a new rule.s 8
In the case of remote sensing, direct television broadcasting,
and the use of nuclear power sources, the General Assembly has
adopted specific declarations setting out the legal principles for-
135 Id.
136 For an index of resolutions relating to outer space, see Index of Online Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions Relating to Outer Space, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF.,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/gares/index.html (last visited
May 19, 2014).
137 See United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. OFF. FOR
OUTER SPACE AFF., http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/COPUOS/copuos.
html (last visited May 19, 2014).
-3 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 254-55 (July 8).
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mulated by the Legal Sub-Committee that apply to those activi-
ties.19 In the case of satellite telecommunications, in contrast to
other satellite applications, the international community has
gone much further by having these activities regulated by the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), as discussed in
greater detail below.140 At the other end of the continuum,
there are no specific principles of international law concerned
with the use of global positioning systems.
B. REMOTE SENSING
1. The Law of Remote Sensing
In response to the need for specific legal rules for remote
sensing activities, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Re-
mote Sensing Principles to govern the remote sensing activities
of states, their nationals, and commercial entities. 14 1 In the Re-
mote Sensing Principles, "remote sensing" is defined as activities
involving "the sensing of the Earth's surface from space by mak-
ing use of the properties of electromagnetic waves emitted, re-
flected or diffracted by the sensed objects."1 42
One major concern related to remote sensing is its potentially
detrimental effect on the sovereignty and interests of the
"sensed" states. This is especially the case where the states that
are subject to the remote sensing activities of other states have
not consented to the activities and have not been consulted
prior to the activities taking place. As a result, the Remote Sens-
ing Principles address remote sensing as well as the data pro-
duced, including the processing of the "primary data" and the
dissemination of "analyzed information. "14 As with most other
international space law instruments, the Remote Sensing Princi-
ples require states to "promote international cooperation" by al-
lowing participation of all states on "equitable and mutually
acceptable terms."144 Further, the Remote Sensing Principles
139 See, e.g., RIcKYJ. LEE, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL MINING OF MIN-
ERALS IN OUTER SPACE 116-17 (2012).
40 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication
Union art. 45, Dec. 22, 1992, 1825 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter ITU Constitution
and Convention].
141 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A.
Res. 41/65, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Remote
Sensing Principles].
142 Id.
143 Id. princ. XII.
144 Id. princ. V.
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call for the establishment of international processing facilities
for remote sensing data "within the framework of regional
agreements and arrangements wherever feasible.""' The use of
vague phrases such as "whenever feasible" and "mutually accept-
able" have ensured that the terms of the Remote Sensing Princi-
ples would not be specific enough to be overly controversial for
the industrialized states but would still address the real or ideo-
logical concerns of the developing states.1 4 6
This is not to suggest that the Remote Sensing Principles pro-
vide no legal obstacles to military satellite reconnaissance activi-
ties. Specifically, Principle I requires remote sensing activities to
be undertaken to improve "natural resources management, land
use and the protection of the environment."'47 This leaves open
the interpretation that remote sensing technologies can only be
applied for those limited purposes, thus prohibiting any military
application as well as other civilian purposes." Alternatively, a
more creative argument would be to suggest that remote sens-
ing for other purposes is not prohibited but rather falls outside
the purview of the Remote Sensing Principles and is therefore
governed by existing principles of international law that may re-
late to such activities.' 4 9
In terms of international state responsibility for governmental
and private activities, Principle IV of the Remote Sensing Princi-
ples prohibits activities from being "conducted in a manner det-
rimental to the legitimate rights and interests of the sensed
[s] tate" and madates that they be conducted "with due regard to
the rights and interests, in accordance with international law, of
other [s] tates."o50 In regard to the dissemination of data, the Re-
mote Sensing Principles require the distribution of data to be
done on a "non-discriminatory basis" and on "reasonable cost
terms."'5 ' Specifically, Principle XII states:
As soon as the primary data and the processed data concerning
the territory under its jurisdiction are produced, the sensed
[s] tate shall have access to them on a non-discriminatory basis
145 Id. princ. VI.
146 See STEPHEN GOROVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW: ISSUES AND POLICIES
293-302 (1991).
147 Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 141, princ. I(a).
148 Ricky J. Lee, Reconciling International Space Law with the Commercial Realities of
the Twenty-First Century, 4 SING. J. INT'L COMP. L. 198, 216 (2000).
149 Ram Jakhu, International Policy and Law-Making Process for Remote Sensing by
Satellite, 22 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 451, 452 (1997).
150 Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 141, princ. IV.
151 Id. princ. XII.
[ 79100
MILITARY USE OF SATELLITES
and on reasonable cost terms. The sensed [s]tate shall also have
access to the available analysed information concerning the terri-
tory under its jurisdiction in the possession of any [s]tate partici-
pating in remote sensing activities on the same basis and terms,
taking particularly into account the needs and interests of the
developing countries. 1 52
As Ram Jakhu pointed out, there is no definition and no indica-
tion as to what is "reasonable" and what would constitute a "non-
discriminatory basis."' 53 Meanwhile, there is no limitation on the
use of the disseminated data afterwards, which is arguably the
stage at which most harm can be done to the sensed states.
The Remote Sensing Principles also require states to ensure
that remote sensing activities are conducted in accordance with
the Principles and that the operator complies with the "norms
of international law on [s] tate responsibility for remote sensing
activities."'15 This is rather ambiguous since there are, at pre-
sent, no norms of international law on state responsibility for re-
mote sensing activities. The French text, to which the Russian
version is similar, uses the phrase en ce qui concerne instead of
"for," inferring that the provision relates to the applicability of
the general principles of state responsibility to remote sensing
activities.' 5 As each of the texts is equally official in status, it is
difficult to determine which interpretation provides the correct
operation and approach of the provision.
These views have to be balanced with the specific circum-
stances in which the Remote Sensing Principles were adopted,
along with the terms of the Resolution itself. The Remote Sens-
ing Principles resolution was adopted without a vote by the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1986, as were most other space law
principles.' 6 However, some states nonetheless expressed seri-
ous reservations with some of the terms and provisions of the
Remote Sensing Principles, especially the issue of requiring con-
sent from sensed states.'17 The continuing debate over the
152 Id.
153 Jakhu, supra note 149, at 452.
154 Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 141, princ. XIV.
155 See Vladimir Kopal, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer
Space: A Significant Outcome of International Cooperation in the Progressive Development
of Space Law, 30 PROC. COLLOQUiuM L. OUTER SPACE 322, 327 (1987).
156 See Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly at Its 41st Session, U.N. DAG
HAMMARSKJOLD LIBR., http://wwy.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r41_en.shtml
(last visited May 19, 2014).
157 Even though formal consensus was reached, the speeches from various
delegations at the final negotiations indicated that serious differences of opinion
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meaning of the terms "discrimination" and the "reasonable ba-
sis" for the supply of data lends further support to the view that
the Remote Sensing Principles, as a whole, cannot be consid-
ered as evidence of existing principles of customary interna-
tional law.
Although the Remote Sensing Principles as a whole may not
be considered the embodiment of customary international law,
this has not prevented some of its provisions, especially Princi-
ple IV, from crystallizing into custom. In the authors' view, the
fact that the resolution containing the Remote Sensing Princi-
ples was adopted by consensus, with most of the reservations be-
ing made by states advocating a further requirement of consent
to the existing obligation of Principle IV, suggests that the re-
quirement of not undertaking remote sensing activities to the
detriment of legitimate rights and interests of sensed states is
one of virtually universal support and therefore has crystallised
into customary international law. Similarly, the lack of express
reservations or disputes over the operation and application of
Principle XII may allow such a principle to be asserted as a bind-
ing principle of custom as well.
2. Implications of Military Use of Remote Sensing
As discussed above, Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty poses
no obstacles to the use of remote sensing for military purposes,
especially when the use of satellite remote sensing is to further
the fulfillment of the requirements of a Security Council deci-
sion under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter."1 5 Therefore, the
crucial factor in determining the legality of the military use of
remote sensing is whether there is a contravention of Principle
XII, assuming it has crystallized into customary law.
In an armed conflict, the sensing state is highly unlikely to
make available any data collected from the remote sensing oper-
ation to the sensed state on a non-discriminatory basis and on
reasonable cost terms. Therefore, this produces a prima facie
breach of Principle XII of the Remote Sensing Principles, which
does not provide any exceptions in its application, unless there
is a resolution of the Security Council authorizing the denial of
the remote sensing data to the sensed target state, even if it was
remained in the States' approaches to the issue. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Summary Record of the 290th Meeting, Mar.
20, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.290 (Mar. 23, 1978).
158 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art. IV; U.N. Charter ch. VII.
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merely through reference to the use of "any means necessary" or
phrases with like effect."' This is because the obligations arising
under the U.N. Charter would override any obligation imposed
in customary international law (though not by the operation of
Article 103, as it only applies to conflicts with treaties) unless it
has attained the status of jus cogens. '6
C. SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
In addition to the Outer Space Treaty and other general
space law instruments, satellite telecommunications are mainly
regulated by the ITU, whose Member States are bound by the
terms of the ITU Constitution and Convention.'"' There are two
main reasons for the need for international regulation of satel-
lite telecommunications. First, the use of radio frequencies is a
finite resource that must be centrally allocated at an interna-
tional level in order to prevent interference arising from differ-
ent states utilizing the same or similar frequencies for their
services.' 6 2 Secondly, with the advent of satellite telecommunica-
tions, it was recognized early on that the use of the geostationary
orbit would have to be controlled. 1 6 Article 44 of the ITU Con-
stitution and Convention states that:
1. Members shall endeavour to limit the number of frequencies
and the spectrum used to the minimum essential to provide
in a satisfactory manner the necessary services. To that end,
they shall endeavour to apply the latest technical advances as
soon as possible.
2. In using frequency bands for radio services, Member States
shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and any associated
orbits, including the geostationary-satellite orbit, are limited
natural resources and that they must be used rationally, effi-
ciently and economically, in conformity with the provisions
of the Radio Regulations, so that countries or groups of
countries may have equitable access to those orbits and fre-
quencies, taking into account the special needs of the devel-
oping countries and the geographical situation of particular
countries.
'39 Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 141, princ. VII.
160 See Kamrul Hossain, The Concept ofJus Cogens and the Obligation Under the U.N.
Charter, 3 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 72 (2005).
161 ITU Constitution and Convention, supra note 140, art. 3, para. 1.
162 Id. art. 44, para. 1.
163 Id. art. 44, para. 2.
164 Id. art. 44.
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In addition to general regulatory provisions, the ITU Constitu-
tion and Convention also sets out several principles in relation
to the conduct of satellite telecommunications.1 6 5 For example,
telecommunications devices cannot be established or operated
in such a manner that causes harmful interference to the radio
communications or services of other states. 6 6 The term "harm-
ful interference" is defined in the Annex of the ITU Constitu-
tion as "interference which endangers the functioning of a
radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously de-
grades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunica-
tion service operating in accordance with the Radio
Regulations."1 6 7
More relevant to the issue of military use is Article 48, which
provides:
1. Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to
military radio installations.
2. Nevertheless, these installations must, so far as possible, ob-
serve statutory provisions relative to giving assistance in case
of distress and to the measures to be taken to prevent harm-
ful interference, and the provisions of the Administrative
Regulations concerning the types of emission and the fre-
quencies to be used, according to the nature of the service
performed by such installations.
3. Moreover, when these installations take part in the service of
public correspondence or other services governed by the Ad-
ministrative Regulations, they must, in general, comply with
the regulatory provisions for the conduct of such services.'
It is clear that the "entire freedom" referred to in the first
paragraph of Article 48 means that any military use of radio
communications would be subject only to the obligations set out
in the second paragraph of Article 48. This is an implicit en-
dorsement of the view that Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty
does not amount to a broad requirement for outer space to be
used for peaceful purposes only-such a broad interpretation
would clearly eliminate any existing "freedom" concerning mili-
tary radio installations. Consequently, there would be some diffi-
culty in asserting that international law, particularly
international space law, imposes any restriction on the military
use of satellites for communications purposes.
165 Id. arts. 33-43.
166 Id. art. 45.
167 Id. Annex.
18 Id. arts. 45, 46.
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VII. FUTURE USE OF SATELLITE APPLICATIONS IN THE
WAR ON TERROR
A. OVERVIEW
The U.S. military is currently investigating the use of high alti-
tude, Long Loiter airships, akin to early reconnaissance platforms
as simple as hot air balloons. 9 This technology offers the ability
to persistently survey an area without the need for refueling, can
operate at altitudes between eighteen and sixty kilometers above
the Earth, and has a lower cost than the launching of satel-
lites.'o This ability to consistently monitor would give greater
strategic advantage than ground surveilance, avoiding the
problems of camouflage techniques and the hiding of forces
among the buildings and streets of urban areas. Notably, this
system operates at a height where international space law princi-
ples may not be considered applicable."' However, the opera-
tion of the system would likely raise a myriad of aviation law and
other international law considerations.
B. RADIO INTERFERENCE
It is no secret that GPS navigation systems are vulnerable.
Given their critical importance to national security strategies,
development of risk mitigation strategies are crucial. GPS signals
are weak and are susceptible to radio interference. GPSjammers
are readily available, and ajamming attack could be mounted at
low cost at any time.' 2 In 2000, U.S. and Australian militaries
conducted trials that "demonstrated that the vulnerability of
[GPS] receivers to interference can be greatly reduced.""' A sys-
tem called the GPS Jammer Locater system (JLOC) has been
designed to "locate GPS jamming/interference sources and pro-
vide data . . . to assist in defeating these sources."'7 4
169 High Altitude, Long Loiter (HALL) UAV, DEFENSE-UPDATE.COM, http://de-
fense-update.com/20081030_hall_uav.html (last visited May 19, 2014).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Dan Parsons, Simple, Inexpensive jammers Threaten GPS, NAT'L DEF. (Sept.
2013), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/september/
pages/simple,inexpensivejammersthreatenGPS.aspx; see IT Security Expert Advisory
Group (ITSEAG), TRUSTED INFO. SHARING NETWORK, http://www.tisn.gov.au/
Pages/IT-Security-Group.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
'73 Press Release, DSTO 4/2000, Australia-U.S. Defense Trials Point to More
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C. ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS
1. Overview
Although there is no international legal instrument presently
in force that specifically regulates the testing, deployment, and
use of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons in outer space, these mili-
tary exercises nonetheless do not occur in a legal vacuum. From
a legal perspective, these tests bring to the forefront certain le-
gal issues concerning the testing of weapons and military exer-
cises in outer space. In this context, Articles IV and IX of the
Outer Space Treaty need to be analyzed and considered.
2. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty creates three specific du-
ties, specifically:
1) State Parties are to conduct their activities with due regard
to the corresponding interests of all other State Parties to
the Outer Space Treaty;
2) studies of outer space are to be pursued and explorations
of outer space are to be conducted so as to avoid harmful
contamination of outer space and adverse changes in the
environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction
of extra-terrestrial matter and, where necessary, appropri-
ate measures are to be adopted for this purpose by State
Parties; and
3) if a State Party has reason to believe that an activity or exper-
iment planned would cause potentially harmful interference
with the activities of other State Parties in their peaceful
exploration and use of outer space, then the planning
State Party is to undertake appropriate international con-
sultations before proceeding with the activity.1 75
Further, Article IX creates two corresponding rights for each
state. These are:
1) the right to have its interests in outer space cared for by
other State Parties through the exercise of due regard;
and
2) the right to request consultation on a specific activity
should a State Party have reason to believe that an activity
or experiment planned by another State Party in outer
space could cause potentially harmful interference with its
17 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art. IX (emphasis added).
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activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space. 1 7 6
The duty to avoid harmful interference applies to states that
pursue studies of and conduct exploration of outer space.' 7 7
Consequently, this duty would only apply to the testing of space
weapons that include the pursuit of a study of or the conduct of
exploration of outer space; the duty would not be applicable to
the simple test of a space weapon occuring independently of
these two factors. Furthermore, this duty establishes an example
of a specific procedural content to the application of the norm
of due regard in the Outer Space Treaty.'7 Although a literal
reading of the provisions of Article IX would suggest that there
is no duty to avoid harmful interference if the activity being con-
ducted is not of an academic, scientific, or exploratory nature, it
is submitted that this would not confine the meaning and scope
of the duty to have due regard to the corresponding interest of
other states. In other words, the reference to the conduct of sci-
entific or exploratory pursuits may be interpreted in an expan-
sive rather than restrictive context.
The positive duty to conduct international consultations
where there is a risk of harmful interference is applicable to the
testing of space weapons but is contingent upon the subjective
perception of the state conducting the test.'17 Consequently, the
normative disposition of this obligation is structurally weak as it
is contingent upon the self-interest of the state, as determined
subjectively by that state, in applying the norm. Again, in analyz-
ing state practice, one can only conclude that China and the
United States did not consider that the resulting debris field
from their ASAT kinetic-kill vehicle tests would cause harmful
potential interference to the space activities of other states. This
pattern of state practice in interpreting the Outer Space Treaty
is certainly a cause for concern insofar as it indicates that ASAT
tests remain extraneous to the Treaty's normative structure.
3. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty
The space weapons under development or consideration to-
day are primarily conventional. Some space weapons, such as
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force of their kinetic energy."' Consequently, considering the
history of the term "weapons of mass destruction," one can de-
bate whether the normative disposition of the Outer Space
Treaty encompasses such weapons. If one were to reinterpret
the normative dispositions concerning weapons of mass destruc-
tion in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, specifically under a
broad definition of the term "weapon of mass destruction" that
would reincorporate the original meaning the term, Article IV
of the Outer Space Treaty could well apply to conventional
space weapons that may cause mass destruction from their use.
It should be noted that such restriction would apply to the effect
of and not to the weapon itself. An ASAT kinetic-kill vehicle that
creates a debris field large enough to indiscriminately destroy
other satellites and that impedes or makes it dangerous to access
or use outer space may well be considered a weapon of mass
destruction, though it is unlikely that the international commu-
nity would elect to adopt such a broad interpretation of the
term "weapon of mass destruction" and thereby restrain the de-
velopment of such weapons.
D. WEAPONIZATION
1. Generally
From the above analysis, it is apparent that the deployment of
conventional weapons in outer space, even in orbit around
Earth, is not prohibited by the corpus of international space law.
This is because Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits
only the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction in outer space sensu stricto and is silent on the
subject of conventional weapons." The specificity in referring
to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction may be a
deliberate exclusion of conventional weapons on the part of the
framers of Article IV from the scope of the Treaty's application.
Further, as discussed above, there is a real possibility that the
deployment of such conventional weapons in outer space would
not contravene the duties and obligations imposed under Arti-
cles I and IX of the Outer Space Treaty.
Such a conclusion is subject to the caveat that Article IV of the
Outer Space Treaty requires the Moon and other celestial bod-
180 A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://
www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons-and_globalsecurity/space-weapons/policy
issues/a-history-of-anti-satellite.html (last visited May 19, 2014).
181 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art. IV.
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ies to be used exclusively for "peaceful purposes" and specifi-
cally prohibits the "establishment of military bases, installations
and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons [,] and the
conduct of military maneuvers" on the Moon and celestial bod-
ies.'8 2 Some states, such as the former Soviet Union, interpreted
the phrase "exclusively for peaceful purposes" as prohibiting all
military activities, with the exception of those which are specifi-
cally permitted within the Outer Space Treaty."' As Nandasiri
Jasentuliyana pointed out, advocates of this theory cite the Stat-
ute of the International Atomic Energy Agency that differenti-
ates "peaceful" from "military" uses of atomic energy, making all
military activities nonpeaceful."' Ivan Vlasic also highlighted
that in early interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty, the So-
viet publicists had preferred to interpret "peaceful" as meaning
"non-military."1 8 5 Conversely, western states have consistently in-
terpreted the word "peaceful" to exclude only acts of aggres-
sion."1 6 The Moon Agreement further prohibits "any threat or
use of force or any other hostile act or threat of hostile act,"
including using celestial bodies "in order to commit any such
act or to engage in any such threat.""' Such prohibitions in the
Moon Agreement apply not only to the Moon and other celes-
tial bodies in the Solar System but also to the orbits around
them and trajectories to and around them.' These prohibi-
tions, however, would have limited legal effect in the context of
the lawful use of military force as sanctioned by the Security
Council under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter or as part of the
182 Id.
183 NANDASIRI JASENTULIYANA, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW AND THE UNITED NA-
TIONS 105-06 (1999).
184 Id.
185 Ivan A. Vlasic, The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE
PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE 39 (BhupendraJasani ed., 1991).
186 Christol provides an excellent description of the drafting history of the
Outer Space Treaty along with a discussion of the possible interpretations of
"peaceful purposes" and various proposals made by the United States and the
Soviet Union. CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAw OF OUTER
SPACE 22-26 (1982).
187 Moon Agreement, supra note 95, art. 3(2).
188 Id. arts. 1 (1)-(2). However, it must be noted that as ofJanuary 1, 2013, only
fifteen states have ratified the Moon Agreement, and the only space powers
among this group are Australia and France. See Status of the Moon Agreement, U.N.
OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/treatys-
tatus/index.html (last visited May 19, 2014).
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exercise of the jus cogens right to self-defense as recognized by
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
The operation of these two principles prevail over the
prohibitions contained in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty
and Article 3 of the Moon Agreement, the former as a result of
the operation of Articles 25 and 103 of the U.N. Charter, and
the latter as a result of the operation of Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention. Accordingly, to the extent that any restriction can
be said to apply to the weaponization of outer space under the
Outer Space Treaty, such restriction must be considered within
the context of the legality of the activity under the U.N. Charter.
In other words, the legality of such actions depend not on the
Outer Space Treaty but rather on the U.N. Charter.
2. Weaponization by Private Actors
The legality of the deployment of conventional weapons in
Earth orbit by a private entity is, however, somewhat legally du-
bious. Belligerent rights, namely the application of military
force within the international community, may only be exer-
cised by states in a manner that is consistent with international
law.' Consequently, non-state actors cannot use these argu-
ments to justify the legality of the deployment of weapons in
outer space, though commentators have suggested that state ac-
tors have the inherent right to use force in self-defense against
non-state actors.1 90 Should non-state actors ever place conven-
tional weapons in Earth orbit, the use of such weapons during
an international armed conflict would be legally questionable,
subject to the norms concerning the direct participation in hos-
tilities by civilians and mercenaries. The principles recognized
in The Hostages Trial at the end of the World War II may apply to
military operations in outer space, namely:
[T] he rule is established that a civilian who aids, abets or partici-
pates in the fighting is liable to punishment as a war criminal
under the laws of war. Fighting is legitimate only for combatant
personnel of a country. It is only this group that is entitled to
189 See, e.g., Tarcisio Gazzini, The Rules on the Use of Force at the Beginning of the
XXI Century, 11 J. CONFLICT SECURITY L. 319, 322 (2006); ALEXANDROV, supra note
124; DINSTEIN, supra note 124, at 164.
190 See, e.g., Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-Emptive Force, 14 EUR.
J. INT'L. L. 227, 233 (2003); Tom Ruys & Sten Verhoeven, Attacks by Private Actors
and the Right of Self-Defence, 10 J. CoNFLCT SEC. L. 289, 289 (2005); Eric P.J. Myjer
& Nigel D. White, The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defence?, 7 J.
CONFLICT SEC. L. 5, 7 (2002).
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treatment as prisoners of war and incurs no liability beyond de-
tention after capture or surrender.'91
Further, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty requires that:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility
for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities and for
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with
the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of
non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and con-
tinuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the
Treaty. 19 2
It is clear from the terms of Article VI that states are required
to ensure that activities of private entities are subject to "authori-
zation" and "continuing supervision" and that they are to bear
international responsibility for such activities."' Accordingly,
the states would be required to ensure that the military activities
of private entities, including the deployment and use of conven-
tional weapons in Earth orbit, conform to the principles of in-
ternational law.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The use of satellite applications has become an integral part
of the contemporary conduct of military operations, from the
low-bandwidth uses of GPS, voice communications, signals in-
tercepts, and low-resolution radar remote sensing imagery, to
high-bandwidth uses of live video streaming, direct media
broadcasting, and high-resolution optical remote sensing im-
agery. This is particularly notable in the War on Terror Opera-
tions, where ground communications infrastructure may be
unavailable (like in Afghanistan) or unsecured (like in Iraq).
191 The Hostages Trial: Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, 8 LAw REP. TRIALS WAR
CRIMINALS 34, 58 (1949); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 131. For an
excellent analysis of Additional Protocol I, see Michael N. Schmitt, "Direct Partici-
pation in Hostilities" and 21st Century Armed Conflict, in CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND
HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 505-29 (Horst Fischer and Dieter Fleck eds., 2004).
192 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 94, art. VI.
193 See Armel Kerrest, Commercial Use of Space, Including Launching, in 2004
SPACE LAW CONFERENCE: PAPER ASSEMBLE 200 (2005); Elisabeth Back Impal-
lomeni, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS/REPUBLIC OF KoREA WORKSHOP ON SPACE LAW 348-51 (2003); RickyJ. Lee,
Liability Arising from Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty: States, Domestic Law and Pri-
vate Operators, 48 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 216 (2005).
2014] 111.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The present race by the U.S. government to acquire additional
satellite capacity to fulfill its insatiable demand for bandwidth is
a clear sign of the need to command available space assets in the
conduct of modern military operations.
It is apparent that the existing body of international law, de-
spite the policy pronouncements of reserving outer space sensu
lato exclusively for peaceful uses and purposes, does not in fact
prohibit the use of satellite applications for military purposes,
regardless of the lawfulness of the underlying military activities
making use of the satellite applications.
With the international community unlikely to agree to any le-
gal prohibition on military uses of satellite applications per se,
the question that needs to be resolved in the reasonably near
future is whether certain restrictions ought to be imposed on
the military use of satellite applications. In particular, the mili-
tary use of satellite remote sensing and direct radio and televi-
sion broadcasting services and their interference or jamming by
states and private actors ought to be subjected to some interna-
tional legal restrictions. Such restrictions would help ensure that
the tactical or strategic value of such assets would be limited in
practice to reduce the likelihood that such assets would become
legitimate targets for the use of armed force in outer space or
for the growing population of spacecraft to be dominated by
military assets.
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